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Abstract—The use of multi-terminal HVDC to integrate wind 
power coming from the North Sea opens de door for a new 
transmission system model, the DC-Independent System 
Operator (DC-ISO). DC-ISO will face highly stressed and 
varying conditions that requires new risk assessment tools to 
ensure security of supply. This paper proposes a novel risk-based 
static security assessment methodology named risk-based DC 
security assessment (RB-DCSA). It combines a probabilistic 
approach to include uncertainties and a fuzzy inference system to 
quantify the systemic and individual component risk associated 
with operational scenarios considering uncertainties.  The 
proposed methodology is illustrated using a multi-terminal 
HVDC system where the variability of wind speed at the offshore 
wind is included. 
Keywords— Fuzy; Fuzzy Inference system; HVDC; multi-
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The draft Network Code on High Voltage Direct Current 
Connections and DC-connected Power Park Modules 
promotes investments in infrastructure in a non-discriminatory 
way, fair access to the network for new entrants and 
transparency in the market. These conditions make possible the 
rise of a new transmission system model, the DC-Independent 
System Operator (DC-ISO).  There are so many challenges to 
be faced by the futures DC-ISO, however the exclusive uses of 
HVDCs to facilitate cross-border bulk power transfers and the 
massive integration of offshore wind power coming from the 
North Sea, along with  dynamically changing market, will 
entail facing increasing uncertainties in the transmission system 
operation. Hence, DC-transmission asset will be prone to be 
operated in more highly stressed and varying conditions, so 
risk assessment tools are crucial to ensure security of supply 
[1].  
Assessing power system security in an environment 
massively populated by uncertainties is a complex and 
comprehensive task involving a multitude of factors, and 
dimensions. Several methodologies for security assessment 
have been developed over decades, each solving a specific part 
of the overall problem and there are different indicators in use 
to describe security [2]. Considerable effort has been devoted 
to the power system risk assessment using the probabilistic 
techniques [3], [4]. More recent, efforts to introduce online 
dynamic and static security assessment has been well 
documented in literature [5], [6]. Probabilistic techniques are 
often utilized in security assessment of HVDC system [7], 
however, there is a lack of development in terms of risk 
assessment of model multi-terminal HVDC systems (MTDC). 
This paper proposes a novel risk-based static security 
assessment (RSSA) methodology named risk-based DC 
Security Assessment (RB-DCSA). It is used to quantify the risk 
associated with forecasted operational scenarios by considering 
the probability and severity of DC-voltage excursions, overload 
on cables and converter stations. The methodology provides an 
efficient risk assessment to a future DC-Independent System 
Operator (DC-ISO). It is based on indices (per individual 
component and system) which facilitate the decisions-making 
process in a time frame in which the decision is effective. The 
paper is organized as follows: Section II briefly defines the 
main considerations about DC-ISO and establishes the 
backgrounds about DC voltage and power control modes in 
MTDC with a brief discussion about probabilistic power flow. 
Section III focuses on the risk-based static security assessment 
proposed in this paper. Section IV presents on-line risk 
inference system strategy and Section V presents the proposed 
methodology. Section VI illustrates application examples on a 
representative test system of a future DC-ISO.  Section VII 
concludes. 
II. DC-INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR (DC-ISO) 
One key element of the liberalization of electricity sector 
was separation of the control of the operation (and often the 
ownership) of the transmission system to ensure fair 
competition between generation companies requiring access to 
the monopoly transmission system. The United States of 
America has generally followed one model for achieving this – 
the creation of a stand-alone independent system operator (or 
ISO), later also known as a regional transmission organization 
(or RTO). The ISO has responsibility for controlling the access 
to and use of the transmission grid by competing generators 
and retailers. Europe has similar organizational categories to 
ISO, the European commission defines the term transmission 
system operator (TSO) as a company that is responsible for 
operating, maintaining and developing the transmission system 
for a control area and its interconnections. In England and 
Wales a different model for facilitating competition was 
followed, with the creation of the National Grid Company 
(NGC). NGC is an independent transmission system operator 
(ITSO) which owns the transmission wires as well as controls 
their operation. 
The introduction of HVDC grids brings with it major 
challenges, and opportunities. It has being recognized by 
ENTSO-E by creation of the most recent draft Network Code 
on High Voltage Direct Current Connections and DC-
connected Power Park Modules [8]. It establishes rules for 
HVDC Systems and a common framework for connection 
agreements between network operators and all agents involved. 
Network Code established that any natural or legal entity is 
allowed to owning or developing a HVDC system. It opens the 
door to promote investments in infrastructure in a non-
discriminatory way, fair access to the network for new entrants 
and transparency in the market -EU law 2009/72/EC.  
 The most popular European Model on transmission system 
is the ownership unbundling (OU) and using this clear-cut 
separation two possible scenarios on HVDC systems: (i) DC-
Independent System Operator (DC-ISO): a fully unbundled 
HVDC System Operators without the grid assets (still 
belonging to an integrated company) and (ii) DC-Independent 
Transmission Operators (DC-ITO): a DC Transmission System 
Operator owning the assets and belonging to a vertically 
integrated company, with special rules to guarantee its 
independence.  In this paper, DC-ISO is defined as a private or 
public entity, and it to coordinates, controls and monitors the 
operation of the DC transmission system involving one or 
several power park modules and one or several TSOs. DC-ISO 
is expected to perform the same functions as ISOs, but cover 
only the MTDC system. 
A. DC Voltage and Power Control Modes in MTDC 
There a are three main DC voltage control modes used on a  
VSC-HVDC terminal [9]: (i) constant power mode, (ii) 
constant voltage mode or (iii) droop mode of control. The DC 
voltage versus power characteristic curve those controllers are 
shown on Fig. 
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Figure 1. DC voltage versus power characteristics. (a). DC bus power 
controller (b). DC voltage regulator (c). DC voltage droop controller. 
The DC voltage characteristics of constant power control 
mode is such that the power flow via the VSC-HVDC terminal 
(PDC) remains constant and equal to the power reference (Pref) 
regardless of the level of the DC voltage (UDC), hence the 
vertical characteristic line in Fig. 1(a). Constant DC voltage 
control mode is such that VSC-HVDC voltage level (UDC) 
remains constant and equal to the DC voltage reference (Uref) 
regardless of the level of the power (PDC). The DC 
characteristic curve of a constant DC voltage controller is 
horizontal line corresponding to the dc voltage reference (Uref) 
depicted in Fig. 1(b). 
DC voltage droop control can be seen as a combination of 
the two types of VSC-HVDC controls. It tries to control power 
to its reference level while at the same time contributing some 
balancing power. Since these two actions are somewhat 
contradicting (i.e., power control and DC voltage control) one 
action happens at the cost of steady state deviations for the 
other. DC voltage droop characteristic is shown in Fig. 1(c). 
The symbol RDC refers to the DC voltage response and has the 
unit of MW/kV. The slope is often given in terms of the DC 
droop constant (DC), which is the ratio of change in DC bus 
voltage to the corresponding change in converter power both in 
per-units. It could also be defined as the change in DC voltage 
in per-unit that results in 100% change in converter power 
flow. The DC voltage droop constant (DC) and the DC voltage 
response (RDC) are related to each other by: 
rated
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U 
  (1) 
where Prated and Urated refer to rated power and rated DC 
voltage of the DC terminal, respectively. The relation between 
DC voltage and converter power at steady on a VSC-HVDC 
terminal using DC voltage droop control is given by: 
 
1
DC ref ref DC
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R
    (2) 
It could be noted that the steady-state characteristics in 
constant power control mode and constant DC voltage control 
mode could be represented by DC voltage droop controllers 
with RDC = 0 (i.e. DC = ), and RDC =  (DC = 0), 
respectively. 
B. DC Voltage Steady-State including Uncertainties 
The Deterministic Power Flow (DPF) is used to analyse 
and assess the planning and operating conditions of power 
system on a daily routine. DPF uses specific values of power 
generations and load demands of a selected network 
configuration to calculate system states and power flows [10]. 
The vector P, which refers to power flow into the DC grid 
via the dc terminals, is given by: 
 convK dc dcP = U YU  (3) 
where Y refers to the admittance matrix of the HVDC grid and 
the symbol  is entry-wise (point-to-point) matrix 
multiplication operator, also called Hadamard product 
operator. In Probabilistic Power Flow (PPF), uncertainties in 
the power system are modelled as random variables and the 
output of the power flow calculations are probabilistic 
distributions. The most widely used and straightforward 
numerical approach for the probabilistic power flow analysis 
is Monte Carlo (MC) method. This method substitutes a 
chosen number of values for the stochastic variables and 
parameters of the system model and performs a deterministic 
analysis for each value so that the same number of values are 
obtained in the results. In this paper, the selected approach is a 
probabilistic power flow based on MC simulation. 
III. RISK-BASED STATIC SECURITY ASSESSMENT (RSSA) 
Deterministic Security Assessment provides a simple rule 
for use in making this decision: optimize economy within hard 
constraints of the secure operational region. This approach 
achieved great success in the early power industry. The 
advantages are obvious, however, there are several drawback: 
Not considering the likelihood of contingencies, ignoring the 
impact of non-restrictive incident, not giving the specific 
system risk indicators. The increase number of uncertainties in 
modern power systems, i.e. market, stochastic generation and 
load, etc., imperatively requires more powerful security 
assessment tools. Probabilistic reliability assessment (PRA) is 
a systematic and comprehensive methodology to evaluate risks 
associated in power systems. Risk defined in IEEE Standard 
definitions as a measure of the probability and severity of 
undesired effects: “product of probability and consequence” 
[11]. Risk theory investigates the impact of credible 
contingency on system, and it uses risk index as a measure of 
the system’s exposure to failure. It is also a leading indicator 
for security level which relates to robustness of the system to 
imminent disturbances.  Static security assessment (SSA) is 
used to investigate if under post-disturbance steady-state 
conditions all components will operate within established 
limits. Next subsections presents the main theoretical aspects of 
the risk-based static security assessment (RSSA) used in this 
paper. 
A. Risk Security Assessment 
The basic relation for computing risk associated with an 
operating condition X at time period t (Xt) is given by the 
expected value of the severity (Sev) of the operating condition 
in the next time period (Xt+1): 
    1| |t t tRisk Sev X E Sev X X  (4) 
This expectation, applied to real power systems, is defined 
as the sum of the product of probability of any possible 
assumed credible system contingency (Ei) in the next time 
period and the total risk (or impact) associated with the 
specific contingency.  
   1 1| Pr( , | ) | ,
Ne
t i t t i t
i
Risk Sev X E X X Risk Sev E X            (5) 
where Ne is the number of considered contingencies. In the 
context of a multi-infeed DC network, the DC voltage is the 
most important variable to ensure post-disturbance stable 
operation.  For DC-voltage analysis, the specification of a 
contingency state (Ei) and the operating condition (Xt) allows 
the solution of the deterministic AC/DC power flow. The 
obtained post-disturbance steady-state conditions are included 
in a DC-voltage vector U = [U1, … ,UNb], where the  region of 
interest has Nb nodes. The total risk associated with the 
specific contingency is Risk(Sev|Ei,Xt+1) and it depends on the 
region of interest and also depends on the violations of the 
security level considered. 
The total systemic risk of DC-voltage violations associated 
with the specific contingency (Ei) on the next time period is 
calculated according to: 
   1
1
| , | ,
bN
i t i k
k
Risk Sev E X Risk Sev E U

   (6) 
where Risk(Sev|Uk) represents the probabilistic risk of DC-
voltage violations for the k-th node. It is the expectation of the 
component risk over the uncertain DC voltages on k-th node. 
     | | , Prk i k k kRisk Sev U E U Sev U dU   (7) 
Pr(Uk) is the probability of violations of the security level 
considered at the k-th node DC-voltage (Uk). This is obtained 
of the probabilistic power flow used to obtain the post-
disturbance steady-state conditions considering the stochastic 
model of the considered input uncertainties (e.g. variability on 
wind speed, etc.). Sev(Uk) is the  component severity of the k-th 
node. Acceptability criteria of a DC-voltage level (U) must be 
defined, some criteria used to judge acceptability of system 
performance might be subjective. A severity function is 
assigned to the impact of the DC-voltage, Sev(U). 
B. Total Systemic Risk Index (TSRI) 
The total systemic risk related to violations of the security 
level considered at DC-voltage is calculated according to: 
   1| Pr( , | ) | ,
Ne Nb
t i t t i k
i k
Risk Sev X E X X Risk Sev E U
 
  
 
          (8) 
where TSRI = Risk(Sev|Xt). This is probabilistic security 
indicator that allows forecasting DC-voltage performance 
across all the DC network over time. The idea of this index is 
to provide the risk of system constraint violations, over or 
under DC-voltages, given a specified operating state. 
C. Individual Risk Index (IRI) 
The risk of violations of the security level considered at 
DC-voltage in a particular or individual component is named 
in this paper as Individual Risk Index (IRI). For instance the 
risk of DC-voltage violations, over or under DC-voltage, of 
the k-th node considering the a contingency state, Ei, is 
IRI(Uk,Ei) = IRIUk,i= Risk(Sev|Ei,Uk), as show on (7).  
The IRIUk,i is calculated as a severity function that 
quantifies the consequence of the i-th contingency on DC-
voltage and k-th node, which is weighted by the probability of 
the violation of the acceptability criteria.  
Severity provides a quantitative evaluation of what would 
happen to the power system in the specified condition in terms 
of impact, severity, consequence, or cost. Two extreme 
situations are especially risky in the context of a multi-infeed 
DC network: under voltages (UV) and over voltages (OV).  
The severity function for under voltage is defined specific 
to each node, i.g. k-th node Sev(UkUV). The voltage magnitude 
of each node (Uk) determines the low-voltage severity of that 
bus following the function shown of Fig. 2(a) where Umin 
defines the minimum acceptable voltage and below that value 
the severity of under voltage is maximum (1.00). Sev(UkOV) 
represents over voltage severity function of the k-th node as 
represented on Fig. 2(b).  
IV. RISK INFERENCE SYSTEM 
A. Inference System 
Security may be defined as the probability of the system’s 
operating point remaining in a viable state space, given the 
probabilities of changes in the system (uncertainties defined by 
stochastic model of its randomness). The security assessments 
define if the system is in the normal state, determine whether 
the system is secure or considering uncertainties (i.e. 
contingencies). During system operation, the online 
determination of the security level is fundamental in order to 
take appropriate countermeasures, with the goal of bringing the 
system, if necessary, to a more secure operation condition. 
Security analysis and control have been implemented through a 
number of software packages in modern energy control centres 
[12].  
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(b) Overvoltage Severity function 
Figure 2. Typical severity applied in DC-voltage. 
Increased uncertainties make more and more attractive  the 
use of PRA, which has already been used by many utilities 
since 2001 and sufficient data is now available for the power 
industry to move toward wide-spread implementation of the 
methodology [13]. However, the most important drawbacks 
are the lack of “easy to use” and “comprehensive” PRA tools 
for systems operations and the speed of computation that make 
online PRA. This paper develops a novel online RSSA 
methodology. The risk-based DC-voltage security assessment 
(RB-VS) is used to quantify the risk associated with forecasted 
operational scenarios by considering the probability and 
severity of DC-voltage excursions, overload on cables and 
converter stations. 
B. Fuzzy Risk Inference System (FRIS) 
Future DC-ISO requires a power risk-based security 
assessment in order to get quantification of a security level 
associated with an existing or forecasted operating condition 
take decisions and that is where fuzzy risk inference system 
(FRIS) come in. The FRIS uses system that uses fuzzy set 
theory to map inputs to outputs dealing with reasoning that is 
approximate rather than fixed and exact.  
The proposed FRIS produces a single final risk index 
combining the fuzzy logic assessment with the risk security 
assessment. A cascading two-stage fuzzy inference system (2-
stage FIS) is used in order to obtain a composed risk index per 
contingency, named contingency risk index CRI. It defines 
system risk considering all violations (voltages and overload) 
of the security caused by the i-th contingency state in the 
system. The use of FRIS allows normalize risk indexes and 
combine them into a single one. 
The procedure presented on Section V is used to calculate 
individual risk index (IRI) for the i-th contingency state for the 
following violations of the security: (i) under voltage 
IRI(UUV), overvoltage IRI(UOV), (ii) overload on cables 
IRI(Pcable), and (iii) overload on converter IRI(Pconv). 
A severity function is defined for each violation of the 
security as shown on Fig. 3. 
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Figure 3. Severity functions of the four violations of the security considered. 
 U is the vector of  DC voltages and superscript are used to 
indicates security violations considered by the IRI, under 
voltage (UV)  and overvoltage (OV). Cable and converter 
overloads are included in Pcable and Pconv respectively. For 
instance, overvoltage voltage vector UOV = [0 1 0 0 1], in used 
to represent overvoltage violations on node 2 and 5 of a 5 
nodes DC-network.  
Any security violation (voltage or overload) in only one 
element represents a risky situation, for this reason the most 
unfavourable IRI of the four considered security violation is 
used as input to the FRIS. 
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Figure 4. Proposed cascading two-stage FIS or Fuzzy Risk Inference System 
(FRIS). 
The Stage 1 of the FRIS includes two FIS: (i) Voltage FIS 
and (ii) Overload FIS. The consequence of the contingency 
state on the system voltage is represented through the system 
voltage index (SVI) and the consequence on the system 
overload through the system overload index (OL). Those 
indexes reflect risk related to the security limits violations in 
terms of the whole system. The outputs of all the Stage 1 FIS 
are subsequently compounded using Stage 2 FIS, which 
aggregates the effect of the voltage and overloads violations 
creating the contingency risk index (CRI). The CRI provides a 
unique risk index per contingency, CRI  [0,1],  which can be 
used to rank contingencies per severity of the security 
violation and then decisions maybe taken. The CRI represents 
the effect of violation of security level of the i-th contingency 
status. Now, the total system risk index (TSRI) of the risk of 
the whole power systems to all contingency statuses is 
calculated considering a convenient weigh of each risk with 
the probability of the contingency occurring. In this paper, of 
probability of any possible assumed credible system 
contingency (Ei) is assumed to be Poisson distributed: 
 1( , | ) 1 expti t t t
j i
Pr E X X e
 

 
    
 
  (9) 
where λt is the occurrence rate of contingency t per unit time.  
In this paper, converter and cable failure rates per year used 
are taken from [6]. 
Finally, the Total Systemic Risk Index (TSRI) consider the 
effect of all the contingencies in one single index as defined 
on (5): 
   1| Pr( , | )
Ne
t i t t i
i
TSRI Risk Sev X E X X CRI E    (10) 
FRIS is used to quantify, SRI, the total system risk 
associated with forecasted operational scenarios by 
considering the probability and severity for violations of the 
security related to: excursions on DC-voltage (under and over 
voltages), overload on cables and converter stations. 
C. Fuzzy  
The universe of discourse of the inputs and the output for 
the three FIS (Voltage FIS, Overload FIS and Aggregator FIS) 
has been partitioned into three linguistic values: low, medium 
and high, variables equally distributed along the interval [0, 1] 
and modelled in triangular fuzzy sets. Fig 5 shows the term set 
and membership functions for the inputs and the output () of 
the as FIS. 
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Figure 5. Term and membership function for inputs and output of Voltage FIS. 
Table I shows the rule base of the specific Voltage FIS and 
Fig. 6 shows the two-dimensional curve that represents the 
mapping between input and output. Membership function, the 
rule base and the 2-D curve of Overload FIS and Aggregator 
FIS are not shown here for space limitation, however, follow 
similar to Voltage FIS.  
TABLE I. RULE BASE OF VOLTAGE FIS 
Rule 
No. 
Antecedents Consequent 
max[IRI(UUV)] max[IRI(UOV)] SVI 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
low 
low 
low 
medium 
medium 
medium 
low 
medium 
high 
low 
medium 
high 
low 
medium 
high 
medium 
medium 
high 
7 
8 
9 
high 
high 
high 
low 
medium 
high 
high 
high 
high 
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Figure 6. Two-dimensional curve that represents the mapping between input 
and output view of Voltage FIS. 
V. METHODOLOGY OF RB-DCSA 
The two previous Sections present a compressive 
explanation of individual aspects of the proposed risk-based 
security assessment of DC systems. This section summarizes 
the proposed methodology:  
Step 1: Establish the stochastic description of the system’s 
uncertainties using historical data or forecasted data where is 
available.  
Step 2: Scenarios are generated to represent forecasted 
states of the power system.  Pseudo-random numbers and the 
stochastic models of uncertainties are used to create the 
scenarios. Correlations between uncertainties can be 
considered and included during this process.  
Step 3: Deterministic System Model Solution is used to 
calculate the steady-state conditions associated to each of the 
scenarios obtained previously. A sequential AC/DC power 
flow is used in this paper; it includes the main features of 
operation and control associated to converter stations [14].  
Step 4: Post Simulation process includes the calculation of 
probabilistic distribution function (PDF) of the main variables 
of interest.  
Step 5: Severity functions are assigned to measure the 
impact on the DC-voltage (under-voltage and overvoltage), 
cable’s overload and converter’s overload.  
Step 6: The component risk and system risk are calculated. 
Equations (7) is used together with the severity function to 
calculate those risks (e.g. risk of DC overvoltage) (details in 
Section IV). 
Step 7: A two-step fuzzy process is used to produce the risk 
associated with a forecasted operating condition. A two-stage 
fuzzy inference system is used to  composes a fuzzy index 
making use of system risk at forecasted operating scenario and 
then a second fuzzy inference is used to impact of a specified 
contingency states (details Section V).  
VI. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
In this Section, a multi-terminal VSC-HVDC text network 
is used to illustrate the methodology of risk-based security 
assessment. A MATLAB® R2014a [15] (version 8.3.0.532 64-
bit) program (m-file) has been developed for this specific 
propose. All simulations are performed using a PC based on 
Intel®, CoreTM i7 CPU 2.5GHz, 16 GB RAM with Windows 
8.1 64-bit operating system. 
A. Test System 
A 5-terminal, 345kV, VSC-HVDC network representative 
of the integration of offshore wind power coming from the 
North Sea is used for illustrative purposes [16] (see Fig. 7). 
All converter stations use symmetrical monopole topology 
using two different DC voltage control modes on the VSC-
HVDC terminals: constant power control modes on the wind 
farm converter stations (WFCi, i = 1, 2) and voltage droop 
control on the grid side converter stations (GSCi, i = 1,… ,3), 
thus enabling N-1 security. 
GSC1 (65)
GSC2 (65)
N1
N2
GSC3 (45)
N3
N4
WFC1 (30)
N5
WFC2 (20) WF2
PWF2
PWF1
AC1
AC2
AC3
 
Figure 7. Five-terminal test network for power flow studies. Rij defines the 
resistance between node i and j in Ohms. Values in parenthesis represent rated 
power in MW [16]. 
B. Uncertainties Modeling and Scenarios 
The unique source of uncertainties in this paper is related to 
randomness of wind speed at the wind farm location. Fig. 8 
shows the stochastic model used for the uncertainties, wind 
speed is modelled using a typical 2-parameter Weibull 
distribution and equivalent wind farm power production is 
calculated using sum of individual wind turbine power 
production. The power curve of  Senvion 6.2M [17], 6,150 kW 
wind turbines are used in this paper.   
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Figure 8.  Probabilistic density function of (a) wind speed and (b) output 
power at WF1. 
DC-ISO is expected to deal with contingencies in the DC 
side of the MTDC caused by: converter outage and cable 
outage. Table II summarize the simulation scenarios 
considered in this paper, starting from a pre-contingency state, 
and including an alphanumeric coding used for analyses 
interpretation. It must be noticed cable between N3 and N5, 
named Cable 3-5 is not include into simulation scenarios. This 
is because contingency on Cable 3-5 is equivalent to lose the 
WFC2 from the system point of view. 
TABLE II. SUMMARY OF SIMULATION SCENARIOS INCLUDING CODING AND 
DETAILS 
Scenario Code Equipment Outage Details 
I None Base Case 
IIA1 
Converter 
GSC1 
IIA2 GSC2 
IIA3 GSC3 
IIB1 WFC1 
IIB2 WFC2 
III14 
Cable 
Cable 1-4 
III24 Cable 2-4 
III34 Cable 3-4 
C. Post-Contingency Steady-state 
Probabilistic power flow is used to calculate the 
probabilistic distribution function of U, Pcable Pconv. It is 
based on 10,000 Monte-Carlo simulations of the scenarios 
shown on Table II. Full results are not presented here for 
space limitation, but few results of Scenario I.A3, GSC3 
outage, are presented for illustrative purposes. Fig. 8 shows 
the probability of overload Cable 4-2 (P45 > 65 MW) and over 
voltages (U3 > 1.10 p.u) at N3. 
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Fig.  1.  Results of Scenario II.A3. Probabilistic density function: (a) power 
flow and (a) DC-voltage. 
A.  Individual Risk Index (IRI) 
Severity functions as shown on Fig. 3 has been used to 
estimate the impact on the DC-voltage (under-voltage and 
overvoltage), cable’s overload and converter’s overload. Fig. 
10 shows how the IRI(UOV) change depending on the 
contingency status, it can be noticed Scenarios II.A1, II.B1 
and II.B2 exhibit not risk of overvoltage and II.A.3 is mots 
risky condition where all nodes exhibit the highest IRI of over 
voltages. All violations of the security has been calculated 
(IRI(UUV), IRI(UOV), IRI(Pcable), IRI(Pconv)). 
B.  Risk-based Security Assessment  
The two-step fuzzy process is used to produce the risk 
associated with the operating conditions. Inputs of the Voltage 
FIS and Overload FIS are depicted in Fig. 11. IRIs indicate 
under voltages are the most important concern on 
contingencies status related to cable outages (III14, III24, 
III34). Scenario IIA2 is the worst situation in terms of 
converter overloads and III24 is a risky situation for cable 
overloads. Now, the consequence of the set of contingency 
status, Scenarios, are evaluated from the systemic point of 
view,  system voltage index (SVI) and system overload index 
(a)                                                          (b) 
(a)                                                          (b) 
 
(OLI), a summary of those results are shown in Fig. 12.  
 
Fig.  2.  Individual Risk Index of Overvoltage IRI(UOV). 
 
Fig.  3.  Maximum Individual Risk Index per Scenario. 
SVI is a lumped index and allows to indicate there is 
system voltage violation but it is not indicates if the violation 
is caused by a low or high voltage. Similar situation happens 
with OLI, where the violation cannot be identify by type of 
equipment: cable or converter. As expected, Scenario I, 
normal operation is a secure operation (CRI = 0), but 
surprisingly, Scenario IIB2 (WF2 outage) allows a safe 
operation. It is followed by Scenario IIB1 (WF1 outage) with 
low risk systemic (CRI < 0.33) caused by equipment 
overloads. The remaining Scenarios are considered to be 
condition of high risk (CRI > 0.66), mainly caused by 
violation of voltage security levels. 
Finally, the Total Systemic Risk Index (TSRI) is calculated 
considering effect of all the contingencies considering the 
occurrence rate of contingency per year shown on Table III 
and IV. TSRI of 0.3313 is obtained and it is classified as 
medium risk (0.33 < risk index <0.66) condition based on the 
considered uncertainties. TSRI is an index looking after whole 
system considering the uncertainty coming from the 
randomness variability provided by the wind speed. 
This is just an illustrative example and it is intended to 
show the use of the proposed methodology and shows the 
potential of those indexes as detect violation of system 
security. 
 
Fig.  4.  Individual Risk Index of Overvoltage IRI(UOV). 
TABLE IIII. OCCURRENCE RATE OF CONTINGENCY 
Equipment Failure rate (1/year) 
Converters 
Cables (100 km) 
0.12 
0.08 
TABLE IV. OCCURRENCE RATE OF CABLE CONTINGENCIES 
Equipment Distance (100km) Failure rate (1/year) 
Cable 1-4 
Cable 2-4 
Cable 3-4 
Cable 3-5 
4.78 
2.04 
3.50 
1.66 
0.38 
0.16 
0.28 
0.05 
II.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper develops a novel risk-based static security 
assessment methodology named risk-based security 
assessment (RB-DCSA). This methodology is used to quantify 
the systemic and individual component risk associated with 
operational scenarios considering uncertainties. Proposed risk 
assessment considers the probability and severity of DC-
voltage excursions, overload on cables and converter stations. 
Monte-Carlo simulations of AC/DC steady-state are used to 
define operational states considering the uncertainty and a 
two-step fuzzy process is used to produce the risk associated 
with the operating conditions.  One advantage of the proposed 
FIS is to allow combine different types security conditions, 
and indexes inside the FIS allows identify, variables, 
equipment and locations of the security violations. The 
proposed methodology has been illustrated using a multi-
terminal HVDC where uncertainties coming from the 
variability of the wind speed in two wind farms is included. 
Results shows the suitability of the proposed methodology to 
identify total system risk, variables causing risky states 
(overload and voltage violations), type of security violation 
(over voltage, under voltage, overload), equipment or node 
where violation is found (node, converter cable) and also, the 
RB-DCSA allows contingency ranking. More evaluations 
must be performed to the methodology performance in order 
to extend it into on-line security assessment. 
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